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Abstract
The paper consists of a summary of the main sources of uncertainty about 
climate change, and a discussion of the major implications for economic analysis 
and  the  formulation  of  climate  policy.  Uncertainty  typically  implies  that  the 
optimal policy is more risk-averse than otherwise, and therefore enhances the 




Uncertainty and climate change policy
The problem of climate change has been described as ‘a unique challenge for 
economics: it is the greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen’ (Stern 
2007, p. i). Among the factors that make climate change a difficult problem, the 
most important is uncertainty about the future course of climate change, and the 
effect of policies aimed at mitigating climate change. There are a great many 
sources  of  uncertainty  inherent  in  the  modelling  and  prediction  of  a  complex 
process  like  climate  change.  In  addition,  political  opponents  of  policies  to 
mitigate  climate  change  have  promoted  spurious  uncertainty  to  provide  a 
justification for their position.
Although there is a large literature on the economic analysis of choice under 
uncertainty, many crucial issues are poorly understood by policymakers and the 
general public. In particular, uncertainty about climate change under ‘business 
as  usual’  policies  is  commonly  seen  as  a  reason  for  inaction.  However, 
uncertainty typically implies that the optimal policy is more risk-averse than 
otherwise, and therefore enhances the case for action to mitigate climate change.
The  paper  consists  of  a  summary  of  the  main  sources  of  uncertainty  about 
climate change, and a discussion of the major implications for economic analysis 
and the formulation of climate policy.
1. Sources of uncertainty
Projections of future climate change are derived from large scale dynamic models 
of the global climate system. Although economists have no special expertise in 
assessing  the  details  of  these  models,  the  economics  profession  has  long 
experience with the general properties  of large scale dynamic models, and with 
the various sources of uncertainty surrounding these models. In this section, a 





A  large  number  of  global  climate  models  have  been  constructed  by  different 
groups of researchers. All such models share the same general form, consisting of 
a large system of differential equations designed to simulate long-term changes 
in  atmospheric  and  ocean  systems.  These  equations  are  converted  to  discrete 
form for a grid modelling the entire global system at a resolution determined by 
limits  on  data  and  computational  capacity.    A  summary  of  the  modelling 
literature  is  provided  by  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change 
(2007a).
There are a large number of choices that must be made in constructing such a 
model.  These  include  choices  of  functional  form  for  equations,  specification  of 
variables,  and  the  details  of  the  process  of  discretisation  and  estimation. 
Inevitably,  different  choices  lead  to  different  results.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
requirement  for  consistency  with  the  observed  data  and  with  fundamental 
physical principles constrains the extent to which model predictions can differ. 
(Thorpe 2005).
The  central  point  may  be  illustrated  with  a  comparison  to  macroeconomic 
models. These also vary widely, and their predictions will differ. Nevertheless, 
despite the existence of a range of uncertainty, all macroeconomic models will 
predict a substantial increase in inflation in response to a doubling of the money 
supply,  just  as  all  climate  models  predict  a  substantial  increase  in  global 
temperatures in response to a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations.
Parameter uncertainty
The parameters of any model are estimated with reference to the available data. 
Given a finite data set, parameters are inevitably estimated with error, and this 




The crucial parameter in a global climate model is climate sensitivity, that is, 
the sensitivity of equilibrium global temperature to a given change in ‘forcing’.   
Forcing  is  the  heating  effect  derived  from  changes  in  the  concentration  of 
greenhouse gases or other sources. Sensitivity is conventionally measured as the 
equilibrium response of average global temperature, to a doubling of the total 
forcings derived from greenhouse gases, measured in CO2 equivalent parts per 
million.   This is a useful basis for discussion since continuation of ‘business as 
usual’ policies is likely to generate a doubling of CO2-equivalent concentrations 
from the pre-industrial level by around the middle of the present century.
It is important to interpret climate sensitivity carefully. On the one hand, it is an 
equilibrium measure, so the estimated change in temperature will not take place 
immediately. On the other hand, under business as usual, there is no reason to 
expect that CO2 concentrations will stabilise at twice the pre-industrial level.
A variety of estimates of climate sensitivity have been presented, some as point 
estimates and some with a range of uncertainty.   Two issues are particularly 
relevant. First, for much of the historical period on which estimates have been 
based,  both  concentrations  of  CO2  and  concentrations  of  other  pollutants 
generated  by  industrial  production  (collectively  referred  to  as  ‘aerosols’)  were 
growing. Hence these variables display collinearity over most of the data period. 
Since around 1960 however, concentrations of aerosols have declined as a result 
of  legislation  restricting  air  pollution,  while  concentrations  of  CO2  and  other 
greenhouse gases have continued to increase.
Most aerosols operate to reduce warming, and thus have an opposite effect to 
that of emissions of CO2. The combination of collinearity and opposite effects 
mean that the larger is the estimated effect of aerosols, the larger is the estimate 
of  climate  sensitivity,  working  in  the  opposite  direction  to  produce  a  given 




can fit the observed movement in global mean temperature, particularly over the 
period when aerosol and CO2 concentrations were highly collinear. This source of 
parameter uncertainty can be reduced by the use of more recent data and by   
comparing trends in the Northern Hemisphere (where industrial pollution has 
produced high levels of aerosols) with those in the Southern Hemisphere (where 
aerosol levels were lower) (Harvey 2000).
Another important issue is the choice between classical approaches to parameter 
uncertainty, which have dominated the literature, and Bayesian approaches that 
allow  the  incorporation  of  relevant  information  from  a  variety  of  sources. 
Bayesian methods generally imply less uncertainty about parameter values than 
classical  methods.  Stainforth  et  al.  (2005),  using  a  classical  approach  suggest 
that  sensitivity  may  be  as  high  as  11  degrees  Celsius,  whereas  Annan  and 
Hargreaves (2006) argue that the correct value almost certainly lies between 1.5 
and 4.5 degrees Celsius.
Uncertainty about emissions
Perhaps the most important single source of uncertainty, in forecasting likely 
climatic conditions in the future, relates to future growth of, or reductions in, 
emissions  in  CO2  and  other  greenhouse  gases.  Some  ‘business  as  usual’ 
projections imply continuing growth in emissions, broadly in line with growth in 
income (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007c). By contrast, policy 
proposals currently under discussion call for reductions in emissions of 50 to 90 
per  cent,  relative  to  current  levels,  by  2050  (Stern  2007;  Garnaut  Climate 
Change Review 2008). The relationship between climate change and uncertainty 
about emissions is complicated by the fact that the policy choices that will help to 





For  some  purposes,  such  as  planning  for  adaptation  to  climate  change,  the 
primary concern is to predict future climate change as accurately as possible, 
taking  account  of  all  relevant  factors.  From  this  perspective  the  adoption  or 
rejection  of  policies  to  reduce  emissions  is  just  one  more  factor  to  take  into 
account.
By  contrast,  in  discussing  climate  change  mitigation,  we  are  comparing  the 
outcomes of alternative courses of action.
A  simple  identity  helps  to  illustrate  the  uncertainties  involved  in  projecting 
emissions of CO2 from energy generation (the most important single source of 
greenhouse gases.
Emissions = Population*Output/Population*Energy/Output* Emissions per unit Energy  (1)
Hence the rate of change of emissions is equal to the sum of the rates of change 
of the variables on the right-hand side. 
Most ‘business as usual’ projections assume that: global population will stabilise 
at around 9 billion after 2050; output per person will grow at a rate of around 2 
per cent per year; and energy intensity of output will decline as incomes rise, but 
that energy use per person will continue to increase. Projections of the emissions 
intensity of energy use in the absence of policy intervention vary widely, with 
some projections suggesting continued reliance on fossil fuels, most notably coal, 
while others suggest that exogenous technological innovations will lead to the 
displacement of coal by alternative energy sources.
Uncertainty about other forcings
Although the growth in emissions of greenhouse gases is the main cause of the 
increase  in  global  temperatures,  many  other  forcings  affect  climate.  None  of 
these  forcings  displays  a  consistent  long  term  trend,  and  therefore  none  can 
explain  the  long  term  growth  in  mean  global  temperatures,  but  uncertainty 




examples include variation in the intensity of solar output and changes in the 
concentration of various aerosols including black soot. 
Feedbacks, sinks and lags
The  direct  forcing  effects  of  increased  atmospheric  concentrations  of  carbon 
dioxide  can  be  determined  fairly  accurately  from  simple  physical  models. 
However, the final impact of any given level of CO2 emissions, and the speed 
with which the global climate system reaches a new equilibrium depend on a 
complex set of feedbacks, sinks and lags (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2007a).
Climate  models  take  account  of  feedbacks  and  lags  operating  within  the 
atmosphere and, to some extent, the capacity of oceans and other global systems 
to  absorb  CO2.  But  there  are  many  other  potential  feedbacks  that  are  poorly 
understood.  For  example,  higher  temperatures  may  lead  to  more,  and  more 
severe, bushfires, with a resulting increase in CO2 emissions.
Uncertainty about costs and benefits
Even  assuming  that  future  changes  in  temperature  could  be  projected  with 
certainty, there would be considerable uncertainty about the costs and benefits. 
The largest economic impacts of climate change are likely to be those affecting 
agriculture. Surveying the literature on this topic, Quiggin (2008) notes:
Analysis of the impact of climate change on agriculture raises 
yet more complexities. The effects of changes in temperature 
and climate will vary across different regions, so that climate 
change will be beneficial in some areas and harmful in others. 
It  is  necessary  to  take  account  of  adaptation  to  climate 
change,  and  therefore  to  take  account  of  both  the  pace  of 
change and the impact of uncertainty on human behaviour. 
Finally,  to  reach  an  economic  evaluation  of  the  impact  of 
climate change, it is necessary to aggregate changes taking 
place  in  different  parts  of  the  world,  at  different  times 
ranging  from  the  present  to  at  least  the  middle  of  this 8
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century, and affecting different people, some of them not yet 
born. 
Looking  specifically  at  Australian  irrigation,  Adamson,  Mallawaarachchi  and 
Quiggin  (2007)  find  that  the  severity  of  climate  change  depends  not  only  on 
projected changes in mean precipitation (snowfall and rainfall), but on whether 
reductions in precipitation take the form of a generally drier climate or of an 
increase in the frequency of severe droughts, such as that being experienced at 
present.
Fabricated uncertainty
Many of the sources of uncertainty described above are common to all forecasts 
and projections of all kinds. However, the typical aim of policy analysis is to 
reduce uncertainty as far as possible, and thereby to permit the formulation of 
policy on the basis of the best available evidence.
Unfortunately, many participants in the debate about climate change are not 
concerned to reduce uncertainty, but rather to increase it, with the objective of 
preventing or delaying policy responses to which they object, either on ideological 
grounds  or  because  they  are  funded  by  firms  such  as  ExxonMobil,  which  are 
likely  to  suffer  financial  losses  as  a  result  of  action  to  reduce  CO2  emissions 
(Royal Society 2006).
One aspect of this process was noted by Burkeman (2003), citing a 2002 memo 
from Republican strategist Frank Luntz to US President George Bush:
"The  scientific  debate  is  closing  [against  us]  but  not  yet 
closed. There is still a window of opportunity to challenge the 
science,"  Mr  Luntz  writes  in  the  memo,  obtained  by  the 
Environmental  Working  Group,  a  Washington-based 
campaigning organisation.
"Voters  believe  that  there  is  no  consensus  about  global 
warming within the scientific community. Should the public 
come  to  believe  that  the  scientific  issues  are  settled,  their 




"Therefore, you need to continue to make the lack of scientific 
certainty a primary issue in the debate." 
The scientific literature on climate change is virtually unanimous regarding the 
validity of the mainstream model (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2007a, Oreskes 2004), and those seeking to manufacture uncertainty (commonly 
self-described  as  ‘skeptics’)  have  not  undertaken  significant  peer  reviewed 
research to justify an opposing conclusion. Rather they have attacked climate 
scientists  and  science  itself  through  a  range  of  think  tanks,  ‘Astroturf’ 
organisations and articles in the mass media, on blogs and through other media.
In the Australian debate, the attempt to fabricate uncertainty with respect to the 
science  of  global  warming  has  been  documented  by  Hamilton  (2007),  Pearse 
(2007) and others. Among organizations promoting spurious uncertainty about 
climate science, the most notable have been the Institute of Public Affairs (a 
politically conservative, industry funded think tank active on a wide range of 
issues) and the Lavoisier Group (one of a number of closely associated single-
issue groups originally established using the resources of the Western Mining 
Corporation).
2. Implications for climate policy
Considering all possible sources of uncertainty, a reasonable range of projections 
for the change in global temperature between the present and 2100 would range 
from zero to 8 degrees Celsius. A reasonable range for the outcome of aggressive 
mitigation polices would run from below zero to around 4 degrees Celsius.
To obtain the low end of these ranges, it is necessary to assume that:
(i) climate sensitivity is at the low end of plausible estimates (say 1.5 degrees 
Celsius) ;




(iii) a significant part of the increase in global temperatures observed in recent 
decades is due to non-greenhouse forcings which will decline in the future; and
(iv) exogenous technological changes will limit, and eventually reverse, growth in 
the consumption of fossil fuels.
For estimates at the high end, it is necessary to assume:
(i) climate sensitivity is at the high end of the range of plausible estimates (say 
4.5 degrees Celsius);
(ii) adjustment lags are relatively short, and likely to become shorter as sinks are 
exhausted;
(iii) positive feedbacks will play an important role; and
(iv) in the absence of aggressive mitigation, there will be no early shift away 
from fossil fuels.
The plausible range of damages associated with a ‘business as usual’ policy range 
from zero (or perhaps small net benefits) to catastrophic damage including the 
extinction of most animal and plant species and threats to the viability of our 
current  civilisation.  Although  the  probability  of  the  extreme  outcomes  is 
relatively small (perhaps 5 per cent based on current understanding) they cannot 
be ignored in formulating policy.  
With aggressive mitigation, the range of net damages ranges from 1–2 per cent 
of  global  income  (a  low  range  estimate  of  the  economic  cost  of  mitigation)  to 
perhaps 10 per cent of income in the case when mitigation is expensive and only 
partially successful.
Economics of uncertainty
The  economic  literature  on  choice  under  uncertainty,  dating  back  to  early 
contributions such as those of Arrow (1951) and Pratt (1963), is huge. However, a 




issues in the debate. Most importantly, uncertainty about the effects of climate 
change implies a requirement for more mitigation, not less. There are several 
reasons for this.
First,  expected  damage,  measured  in  either  physical  or  monetary  terms,  is  a 
convex  function  of  the  rate  of  change  of  global  temperature.    An  increase  in 
global  mean  temperatures  of  4  degrees  Celsius  over  the  next  century  would 
cause far more than twice the damage associated with an increase of 2 degrees 
Celsius, and an increase of 8 degrees Celsius would be utterly catastrophic. So, 
the  expected  damage  associated  with  an  uncertain  future  increase  in 
temperature is more than that associated with a mean or median projection of 
temperature change.
Second, risk aversion implies that the value of a marginal increase in income is 
greater, the lower the level of income. Since mitigation will yield the greatest 
benefit  in  cases  where  the  economic  loss  associated  with  climate  change  is 
largest,  and  therefore  when  income  is  lowest,  the  certainty  equivalent  of  the 
benefits of mitigation exceeds the expected value.
Finally,  as  noted  above,  the  possibility  of  catastrophic  damage  from  climate 
change  cannot  be  ignored.  This  implies  that  the  only  sustainable  policies  are 
those that minimise the risk of catastrophic damage. One way of addressing such 
risks is through the precautionary principle, which implies that we should avoid 
courses of action with poorly-understood possibilities of highly adverse outcomes 
(Quiggin 2006, Weitzman 2007).
These  points  is  illustrated  by  the  economic  analysis  undertaken  in  the  Stern 
Review  (Stern  2007),  which  reported  estimates  of  expected  damages  ranging 
from 5 per cent to 20 per cent of global income under a policy of ‘business as 
usual’.  The  high  estimate  is  dominated  by  relatively  low  probability  events 




not include a formal evaluation of the expected costs of catastrophic losses, the 
possibility of catastrophe is cited as a further reason for immediate action. 
Because the damage associated with climate change is potentially catastrophic, 
it  is  important  to  consider  the  entire  probability  distribution,  rather  than  a 
limited number of parameters such as mean and variance. Policy options that 
provide  protection  against  low  probability  events  in  the  right-hand  (high 
damage) tail of the distribution yield substantial expected benefits.
This is an important result to bear in mind when reading the work of those who 
profess to be sceptical of the findings of mainstream climate science, whether 
they are motivated by honest doubt or by ideological or financial motives. To the 
extent that mainstream scientists may be in error, they are equally likely to err 
in  either  direction.  And  the  dangers  of  underestimating  the  pace  of  climate 
change  are  greater  by  far  than  the  dangers  of  overestimation.  So,  the  more 
uncertain we are about the outcomes, the more certain we should be about the 
need to take action that reduces the rate of climate change.
Because  uncertainty  will  be  resolved  over  time,  it  is  important  to  maintain 
flexibility. Flexibility to adjust policy in the light of new information allows us to 
capture the option value associated with deferred choice. The literature on real 
options (Trigeorgis 1993) provides methods by which option value can be traded 
off against the cost reductions that may be associated with early commitment to 
a given path of emissions.
There  is  unlikely  to  be  much  difficulty  in  maintaining  flexibility  to  relax 
mitigation policy if the problem of climate change turns out to be less serious 
than the current median estimate. Governments can cut taxes on carbon, give 
away additional emissions permits and relax regulatory constraints, all of which 
will generally be popular moves. It will be rather more difficult to maintain the 





The  most  important  task  in  the  short  run  is  to  create  institutions,  such  as 
emissions trading schemes that can deliver substantial reductions in emissions. 
At  this  stage,  long  term  targets,  such  as  the  reduction  in  emissions  to  be 
achieved by 2050, should be regarded as indicators of willingness to act rather 
than firm commitments.
Concluding comments
Uncertainty about the rate of climate change and its consequences has important 
implications for public policy. The main implication as discussed above, is that 
the optimal mitigation effort is greater than it would be if the median projection 
of climate change were known, with certainty, to be correct. 
As uncertainty is resolved over time, policy should be adjusted in the light of new 
information. Perhaps this new information will show that the problem of climate 
change is less severe than current evidence suggests. More likely, it will bring to 
light new aspects of the problem that have not yet been considered. Either way, 
uncertainty about the future does not justify inaction in the present.
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